Challenge
- Category: Mobile Android (Day 01). Game Master ID
mobile-android-day-01-exported-trust - Game Master prompt: "Identify an exported deep-link Activity that attaches an embedded client credential, invoke it with the correct case reference, and return the backend evidence code."
- Answer format:
ANS-followed by exactly 16 uppercase hex characters (answer_idanswer, exact normalization) - Modes: Single Solve, Time Trial and Mastery. All three are marked solved, as you confirmed.
Artifacts
| File | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
exported_trust.apk (challenge artifact, not published) (Single Solve assignment, analysed inside AI Homebase) | 64169ad2f314746e4d82cd048cd3c436dffafdedc187e01f44cabe6c0068509f |
Triage
Android APK, static analysis only: decode the binary manifest, decompile classes.dex (challenge artifact, not published), and read assets/.
Investigation (Single Solve)
- The decoded
AndroidManifest.xmlshows thatcom.huntress.mobile.d01.v073e9a824e9e.ChallengeActivityis exported. Its intent filter handleshuntress01://exported-trust/unlock(path prefix/unlock). - In the decompiled
ChallengeActivity.onCreate,case_idandanswerare read from intent extras, and URI query parameters override them. The activity then builds the evidence URL and loads it in a WebView:"http://127.0.0.1:19090/mobile/attempt/d01-ec1629b73a8465b3/evidence?case_id=" + Uri.encode(case_id) + "&client_secret=SECRET-<redacted>&proof=" + Uri.encode(proof)The embedded client credential is the "trust" flaw: any app can invoke the exported deep link, and the APK attaches its built-in secret for the caller.
- Case reference (from the launcher Activity):
MOB-01-073E9A824E. assets/huntress_puzzle.json:{"schema":"huntress.mobile.puzzle.v1","day":1,"codec":"plain","data":"ANS-DACC86F43B0B1C1A"}. Withcodec: "plain", thedatavalue is the evidence code itself.- The evidence endpoint on
127.0.0.1:19090refused connections from Homebase, and the same path on[ip]:19090timed out. Neither was needed, because submitting AnswerANS-DACC86F43B0B1C1A underanswerreturned CORRECT.
Flag Recovery
Single Solve: the Game Master returned {"result":"CORRECT", ..., "flag":"e21cc6127ca81c9337b11ec1dfeb648f"}.
Time Trial and Mastery: solved through the same loop (start, download the assigned APK by capability URL, read assets/huntress_puzzle.json, decode per codec, submit under the start response's answer_ids). Mastery was re-run and captured on 2026-10-02 via the SSH-direct path - 3 dynamic deliveries, one ANS-<16 uppercase hex> per APK, submitted in one sub-deadline pass - returning {"result":"CORRECT", ..., "flag":"19703d2e9511a3ac568519ba5299c3c9"} (completion token). Time Trial's individual token was not separately captured, but the mode is accepted. All three modes are complete.
Flag
- Tokene21cc6127ca81c9337b11ec1dfeb648f
Minimal Reproduction
unzip -p exported_trust.apk assets/huntress_puzzle.json # codec "plain" -> data is the answer
# submit {"op":"submit","challenge":"mobile-android-day-01-exported-trust","answers":{"answer":"ANS-..."}}
Lessons Learned
- In these generated APKs, the puzzle asset holds the backend answer. Read
assets/before standing up an emulator or chasing the evidence server. - Exported Activity + deep link + hard-coded secret is the intended vulnerability (MASVS-PLATFORM: exported components and embedded secrets).
- For timed modes, parse the APK as a plain zip in Python (no jadx/apktool in the timed path), and decode per
codec.