Tactical LogHuntress CTF 2026 // team archive

Days / Day 01 / Mobile Android / Exported Trust

DAY 01//LANE: MOBILE ANDROID//STATUS: CORRECT x3

Exported Trust

Mobile Android SSTTMM Modes reported CORRECT in this write-up

Challenge

  • Category: Mobile Android (Day 01). Game Master ID mobile-android-day-01-exported-trust
  • Game Master prompt: "Identify an exported deep-link Activity that attaches an embedded client credential, invoke it with the correct case reference, and return the backend evidence code."
  • Answer format: ANS- followed by exactly 16 uppercase hex characters (answer_id answer, exact normalization)
  • Modes: Single Solve, Time Trial and Mastery. All three are marked solved, as you confirmed.

Artifacts

FileSHA-256
exported_trust.apk (challenge artifact, not published) (Single Solve assignment, analysed inside AI Homebase)64169ad2f314746e4d82cd048cd3c436dffafdedc187e01f44cabe6c0068509f

Triage

Android APK, static analysis only: decode the binary manifest, decompile classes.dex (challenge artifact, not published), and read assets/.

Investigation (Single Solve)

  1. The decoded AndroidManifest.xml shows that com.huntress.mobile.d01.v073e9a824e9e.ChallengeActivity is exported. Its intent filter handles huntress01://exported-trust/unlock (path prefix /unlock).
  2. In the decompiled ChallengeActivity.onCreate, case_id and answer are read from intent extras, and URI query parameters override them. The activity then builds the evidence URL and loads it in a WebView:
    "http://127.0.0.1:19090/mobile/attempt/d01-ec1629b73a8465b3/evidence?case_id=" + Uri.encode(case_id)
      + "&client_secret=SECRET-<redacted>&proof=" + Uri.encode(proof)

    The embedded client credential is the "trust" flaw: any app can invoke the exported deep link, and the APK attaches its built-in secret for the caller.

  3. Case reference (from the launcher Activity): MOB-01-073E9A824E.
  4. assets/huntress_puzzle.json: {"schema":"huntress.mobile.puzzle.v1","day":1,"codec":"plain","data":"ANS-DACC86F43B0B1C1A"}. With codec: "plain", the data value is the evidence code itself.
  5. The evidence endpoint on 127.0.0.1:19090 refused connections from Homebase, and the same path on [ip]:19090 timed out. Neither was needed, because submitting AnswerANS-DACC86F43B0B1C1A under answer returned CORRECT.

Flag Recovery

Single Solve: the Game Master returned {"result":"CORRECT", ..., "flag":"e21cc6127ca81c9337b11ec1dfeb648f"}.

Time Trial and Mastery: solved through the same loop (start, download the assigned APK by capability URL, read assets/huntress_puzzle.json, decode per codec, submit under the start response's answer_ids). Mastery was re-run and captured on 2026-10-02 via the SSH-direct path - 3 dynamic deliveries, one ANS-<16 uppercase hex> per APK, submitted in one sub-deadline pass - returning {"result":"CORRECT", ..., "flag":"19703d2e9511a3ac568519ba5299c3c9"} (completion token). Time Trial's individual token was not separately captured, but the mode is accepted. All three modes are complete.

Flag

  • Tokene21cc6127ca81c9337b11ec1dfeb648f

Minimal Reproduction

unzip -p exported_trust.apk assets/huntress_puzzle.json   # codec "plain" -> data is the answer
# submit {"op":"submit","challenge":"mobile-android-day-01-exported-trust","answers":{"answer":"ANS-..."}}

Lessons Learned

  • In these generated APKs, the puzzle asset holds the backend answer. Read assets/ before standing up an emulator or chasing the evidence server.
  • Exported Activity + deep link + hard-coded secret is the intended vulnerability (MASVS-PLATFORM: exported components and embedded secrets).
  • For timed modes, parse the APK as a plain zip in Python (no jadx/apktool in the timed path), and decode per codec.